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The Problem of Debt Collection in Pennsylvania:
Who's Asking for Deliverance?
.. [E]xercise caution in your business affairs: for
the world is full of trickery ....
Excerpt from Desiderata
INTRODUCTION
Debt collection is by no means a new dimension to the myriad of
contemporary dilemmas the legal community is expected to resolve. It
is a concept that follows credit and the credit process has not yielded
to time. History tells of debtor prisons and Shakespeare's The Merchant
of Venice offered a lucid but harsh depiction of the norms confronting
debtors in Elizabethan England.' Over the years, not much has changed
in the realm of credit extension. Issuing credit is big business. Time
has shown there will always be people in need of money just as there
will always be those willing to lend it, at a profit, of course. Paradoxi-
cally, what little has changed with the passage of time is the great
volume of credit now being extended. Since the post-depression days,
the American economy has grown steadily with a marked increase dur-
ing and following World War II. Rapid industrial growth and ad-
vanced technology have been complimented by staggering population
statistics. The country's accelerated growth rate (in all social areas) in
the last forty years has forced expansion of the economy. A natural
consequence of such expansion is greater consumer spending and, ul-
timately, more borrowing. As of February, 1973, nearly 160 billion
dollars of consumer credit was outstanding in the United States.
2
Without being overly presumptuous it can fairly be inferred that most
people are owing to somebody; be it, inter alia, a lending institution,
retailer, buyer of commercial paper or private financier.
There is nothing inherently wrong with buying on credit. It is in
1. For a detailed survey of the evolution of the English and American law governing
collection remedies, see Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A
Historical Inventory and Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. R.v. 155 (1957).
2. Of the actual $157,582,000,000 total amount, $127,959.000,000 was attributed to in-
stallment. credit. 59 FFD. Rzs. BULL. A54 (Apr. 1973). The alarming fact is that these figures
are increasing in accelerated fashion. Consumer credit expanded at the near record -rate of
$2.22 billion in May of this year. Pittsburgh Press, July 5, 1973, at 42, col. 7.
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fact a necessity for most people; a capitalistic society commands it.
Since time stops for no man, every debt eventually becomes due. If
payment is made, the debtor's little world, perhaps revolving within a
galaxy of creditors, will spin freely and without turbulence. However,
experience teaches and reality shows that this utopian situation is not
always the case. For an incalculable amount of reasons many consumers
-with good and poor excuses-fail to meet their debt obligations as
they arise. This event places the debtor in default, thus leaving the
creditor legally wronged. At this point, sight should not be lost of the
fact that the debt in the overwhelming amount of transactions is justly
owed. Since the law does not condone this debtor wrongdoing, the
creditor is permitted to attempt collection. In so doing, bill collectors
utilize means that range anywhere from amiable to malicious.3 Therein
lies the putative aspect of the problem this comment wishes to explore.
What exactly is impermissible conduct in Pennsylvania? No one denies
the creditor's right to secure payment through legal process. It is the
extra-judicial conduct that has caused concern. The legal community
recognizes the importance of permitting private debt collection since
the time and expense of litigation weigh heavily on the already over-
burdened court dockets. While encouraging debt collection the law
must, at the same time, defy any resultant unjust infringement on
debtors' rights. Just what these rights are will be seen later.
It may be stated, perhaps prematurely, that there appears to be little
statutory and virtually no case law delineating the limits of permissible
debt collection activity in Pennsylvania. Without authority there can
be no sanction, thus creditors are left with a relatively free hand in
dealing with debtors.4 If the bounds of reasonableness (subjective of
course) are overstepped-apparently not too infrequently--consumers
voice their cries to sympathetic ears such as local consumer protection
agencies, neighborhood legal services and law students.
Of late, the situation has become disturbing. A steady stream of
complaints, being funneled through appropriate channels, warranted
3. Using these two means-amiable and malicious--as outer markers on a scale arbi-
trarily designed by the writer to delimit permissible conduct, any collection attempt sur-
passing a fictional middle gradation-call it reasonableness-can be termed unreasonable
and perhaps, as will be discussed later, unlawful.
4. In calling for legislation to curb the apparent widespread use of harassing practices,
former State Attorney General, J. Shane Creamer, has stated:
Telephone calls or personal contacts made at unreasonable hours or with unreason-
able frequency, intimidating and offensive langauge and the threat of violence or legal
action are being practiced by collection agencies.
McKeesport Daily News. Oct. 11, 1972, at 38, col. 7.
Vol. 12: 69, 1973
Comments
the direction of public hearings in 1972, by then State Attorney Gen-
eral J. Shane Creamer. 5 These hearings provide many of the arguments
presented on the issue and will be heavily drawn upon for definitional
and exemplary purposes.
This paper will expose the significant aspects of the problem. It will
deal with an issue that is viewed with slanted vision by both sides. Al-
though it is creditor activity that sparked this controversy, the creditor
faction cannot summarily be designated to shoulder the blame without
a close look at the whole picture. There may be many causes. Each
side has valid grievances. It will be the aim of this paper to wade
through the many contentions and, in refuting the unfounded and ex-
tolling the virtuous, be able to formulate a sound appraisal. Desirous
of an end product that will at least afford valuable insight, compari-
sons will be made, society's interests will be weighed, and hopefully,
impartiality coated with a thin layer of logic will prevail.
II. PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES
Before any problem can be discussed with understanding, it must
first be defined. The one inspiring this paper has been rather easily
stated: "What methods are proper to use in an effort to collect debts?"6
What has proven to be difficult is grappling with the practical ramifi-
cations; the events leading up to the emergence of the problem.
Every state no doubt is faced with the dilemma of pacifying the ires
of the two opposing forces. Certain creditors persist in seeking payment
while certain debtors strive (some for good reason) to delay and evade
creditor wants. The situation in Pennsylvania is, in certain respects,
unique and, because of its possible detrimental effect on society, has
prompted this look into what exactly causes the problem, how it is
being dealt with, and on what course it is headed.
5. Hearings were conducted February 23, 1972 in Pittsburgh and March 8, 1972 in
Philadelphia. Because gaining access to the Pittsburgh transcript proved to be a major
task in the preparation of this paper, the Philadelphia hearings can not be referred to.
Indications that testimony of similar collection activity, elicited from that hearing, has been
made known to the writer. The purpose of the hearings was to determine if there was a
need for action by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Consumer Protection or changes in state
legislation itself.
6. Hearings on Debt Collection Practices in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Before
Joel Weisberg, Director of Pennsylvania Bureau of Consumer Protection, Robert Nicholas,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, and Robert S. Adler, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, 73 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (testimony of Joel Weisberg). Al-
though collection abuse is the main point of focus it should be noted that credit abuse is
a major factor and reference will be made to both throughout.
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For a long time creditors have been the overwhelming favorite of
the law. Times do change but for the debtor the pace has been snail-
like3 Not until recent years, with the advent of consumerism, Ralph
Nader and other anti-establishment forces, have debtor rights come to
be recognized.
What has concerned the relatively scant few close to the situation-
those people working for consumer-related agencies and legal services
offices-is the manner in which some creditors and collection agencies
go about collecting their debts. Granted, certain procedures within
the industry may be followed that will prod the honoring of financial
obligations. But when permissible persuasion turns into calculated
dunning and intimidation, the debtor is indeed justified in voicing
a complaint. The problem is now serious enough to merit a resolu-
tion since the rate of complaints coming into various consumer
offices has been, and with no apparent let-up, on the rise.8 Before
focusing on the relevant considerations pertinent to the problem some
prefatory remarks may help to provide a frame of reference as to Penn-
sylvania's present stance in regard to debtors and creditors. This over-
view of the law will help to ascertain in what direction the state may
be leaning should it be called upon to pull for one side in this debtor-
creditor tug of war.
At the outset it should be noted that not every relevant principle
will be discussed or even listed. Also the reader is forewarned that
those mentioned will not necessarily have any direct bearing on the
issue under consideration, i.e., unreasonable methods of. debt collection.
The purpose served by this segment of the paper is merely to ascertain
whether Pennsylvania can be labeled a pro-debtor or a pro-creditor
state. Making such a determination may aid in later analyzing the
issue at hand.
A. Confession of Judgment
Historically, debtors have been underdogs by virtue of the fact that
creditors can obtain judgment without the employment of regular
7. Out of 658 pages of material spanning the text currently being used by Duquesne
University School of Law for the debtors' and creditors' rights course, only six are devoted
to debtors' protection. See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTEcTION
265-70 (1967).
S. Interview with Donna Deaner, Director of the Allegheny County Consumer Protec-
tion Bureau, in Pittsburgh, Oct. 19, 1972; Hearings, supra note 6, at 32-34 (testimony of
Donna Deaner).
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judicial mechanics.9 By signing a sales instrument with the appropriate
provision attached or incorporated the debtor consents to the entry of
judgment even before commencement of any suit.10 In effect, the debtor
consents to a court's jurisdiction without service of process,1 without
notice, and without an opportunity to present defenses. This device
usually goes hand in hand with promissory notes, leases, mortgages and
most any installment purchasing. Despite their awesome legal force
consumers, in need of credit and faced with a "Hobson's Choice," con-
tinue to sign them. It is certainly a speedy and inexpensive approach
to debt collection. How could anyone dispute that "[it] .. .is a useful
device when out of five hundred cognovit judgments only two were
turned into verdicts for defendant."12
However, the very fact that a debtor can be adjudged in default and
subject to property execution and attachment without prior notice and
hearing raises due process questions. Their validity has been subject
not only to serious commentator attack,' 3 but have been prone to judi-
cial criticism as well.14 Despite the overwhelming dislike and judicial
repugnance of cognovit notes, Pennsylvania to this day recognizes them
as a valid collection device.'5 While their vitality has, arguably, been
9. This device is commonly referred to as a confession of judgment or cognovit note.
Cognovit notes contain a provision which permits the creditor or his attorney to appear
on behalf of the debtor and to consent to judgment against him in case of default. For a
good historical treatment of cognovit notes see Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Con-
fess Judgment, 8 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Hunter]; see also Note, Con-
fessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524 (1954).
10. In Pennsylvania a creditor can obtain a judgment lien on a consumer's real estate
immediately upon execution of the note and before any default occurs. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2384 (1967). The note provides security for the seller.
11. O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 44, 12 A.2d 820, 822 (1940).
12. Hunter, supra note 9, at 16. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has most eloquently
described the force of the judgment by confession:
A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most powerful and drastic
document known to civil law. The signer deprives himself of every defense and every
delay, of execution, he waives exemption of personal property from levy and sale
under the exemption laws, he places his cause in the hands of a hostile defender. The
signing of a warrant of attorney is equivalent to a warrior of old entering a combat
by discarding his shield and breaking his sword.
Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953).
13. Hopson, Cognovit, Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit, 29 U. CHi. L. REy. 111 (1961); Comment, Confession of Judgment Procedure-
Unconstitutionality, 75 DicK. L. REv. 169 (1970); Comment, Abolition of the Confession of
Judgment Note in Retail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DIa. L. REV. 115
(1968); Comment, Confessions of Judgment: The Due Process Defects, 43 TEMPLE L.Q.
279 (1970).
• 14. E.g., Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1969) (Judge Breitel offers convincing arguments against squaring this procedure with
constitutional mandates); First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220 Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909).
15. Not only have they been encouraged by state legislation (presumably the vehicle by
which public policy is to be enhanced), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1970), now
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somewhat weakened, 6 at least one writer feels they continue to remain
in force and a potent creditor weapon.' 7
B. Wage Garnishment Prohibition
In defending the cognovit practice creditors forcefully argue that
Pennsylvania is one of few states that exempt wages and salary from
execution.' 8 Garnishment is the procedure by which a creditor seeks
to subject to his claim property of the debtor in the hands of a third
party or money owed by such third person to the debtor.' 9 This general
definition provides the legal apparatus for the special remedy above
mentioned by merely plugging in wages for property and employer for
third party. This device thus affords the creditor realization of his
account receivable while eliminating the intermediary step of first pass-
ing the funds through the debtor. Undeniably an effective collection
remedy, wage garnishment may also serve preventive delinquency func-
tions. It is irrefutable that defaults would be minimized were debtors
made to fear that fruits of their labor might be channelled directly to
the creditor in derogation of daily family needs. Faced with the pos-
sibility of engendering serious social strife-depriving the wage earner
of financial means to satisfy everyday necessities-the Commonwealth's
judiciary is apparently in accord with the legislature. 20
In addition to the wage garnishment statute providing somewhat of
an off-set to the cognovit practice, it should be noted that cognovit
judgments can be opened with relative ease if meritorious defenses are
available to the debtor.21
suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 2950-76, but their existence is recognized independent of stat-
ute. Equipment Corp. of America v. Primos Vanadium Co., 285 Pa. 432, 435, 132 A. 360, 362
(1926).
16. The constitutional validity of Pennsylvania's confession of judgment practice has
recently withstood the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court in Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191 (1972). In holding that the Pennsylvania cognovit procedure was not uncon-
stitutional on its face, the Court did recognize that situations can exist when a debtor will
not knowingly waive his constitutional right to a due process hearing. But see D.H. Over-
myer Co. v. Frick Co. 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (companion case) (the Court concluded the
corporate debtor did waive such right).
17. See Note, The Viability of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Confessions of Judgment
in Pennsylvania, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 103 (1972).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966).
19. 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 1 (1943).
20. See, e.g., Sheryl Records, Inc. v. Pickens, 431 Pa. 299, 245 A.2d 454 (1968) (liberally
construing the statute, royalties to a musician were held to be salary and thus exempt
from attachment).
21. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Rose Hall Cemetery Ass'n, 218 Pa. Super. 366, 281 A.2d 73
(1971).
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C. Legislation
Since the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is in force in Pennsyl-
vania22 and does have application to many credit transactions it is a
logical starting point for statutory review. Scholarly analyses of the
relevant code provisions evoke sentiments generally pro-creditor.
23 It is
indeed arguable that the UCC does not help to equalize the legal
weaponry provided for debtors and creditors. Many reasons can be
asserted. For instance, the provisions reflect the given disparity in bar-
gaining power between seller and buyer; nowhere in the code is de-
fault defined, 24 leaving the creditor the sole determinor. The trigger-
ing of acceleration clauses is precariously controlled by the subjective
test of a creditor's insecurity. 25 Of course, the force of unconscion-
ability,26 although not yet fully tested for effect, can prove to be fruitful
for debtors.27 Whether this debtor advantage can be traced most directly
to the legislature or judiciary is open to question.
There are also other isolated provisions which offer purposeful-
although perhaps dubious-advantages to consumers. For example,
language that disclaims express warranties is rendered inoperative,28
buyers can in certain circumstances revoke an acceptance,2 9 and rejec-
tion of non-conforming goods is permitted.30 And even article 9, long
considered the lethal tip of the creditor's foil, clothes the debtor with
the protections of "notice" and "commercial reasonableness" to thwart
the obvious iniquities spawned by some private sales in the deficiency
judgment area.3 '
Another legislative effort, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC), recently drafted by the Special Committee of the National
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to
the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302 (1972); Schuchman, Profit
on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV.
20 (1969); Comment, Default: The Consumer's Dilemma, 20 KAN. L. REv. 139 (1971).
24. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102, Comment 2.
25. Id. § 1-208.
26. Id. § 2-302.
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("add-on" clause in security agreement); cf. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 23 F. Supp. 864
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (high interest rates); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105
N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (failure to disclose rate of interest and other charges). For
a thorough discussion of the few advantages gained by debtors within the UCC. see
Sheinfeld, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection Activities, 9 Houston
L. Rev. 615, 633 (1972).
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1).
29. Id. § 2-608.
30. Id. § 2-601(a).
31. Id. § 9-504(3).
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has given the
debtor more protection. In its attempt to effect certain controls on the
credit industry without overly restricting the rights of creditors, the
UCCC has provided for a modicum of consumer remedies in recogniz-
ing the need for striking a balance between the relative bargaining
positions of debtors and creditors. To date, however, Pennsylvania has
not been one of the handful of states to adopt it.32
Notwithstanding this fact, Pennsylvania cannot be said to be deficient
with regard to its resident consumer legislation. As its name implies,
the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law3 3 certainly
inures to the consumer's benefit. Although this act is geared for the
most part to prevent deceptive advertising practices it specifically gives
the consumer in certain instances the right to annul a contract or sale
within two days after it has been effected.8 4 Statutory response has also
helped to equalize bargaining strength in particular credit areas. The
Pennsylvania legislature has given special attention to home improve-
ments and automobile financing. Both the Home Improvement Finance
Act,3 5 and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,3 6 afford basic notifica-
tion protections by well-drawn provisions delineating exactly what the
contract is to contain. Primarily enacted to protect automobile buyers
from unscrupulous practices of some car dealers, the Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act is even equipped with required licensing provisions3
7
in an effort to better police the conduct of installment sellers and
financing institutions. Probably the most significant of the consumer-
oriented statutes is the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act 38 be-
cause, with the exception of automobiles and home improvements, it
regulates the commercial installment contract for all goods and services.
Like the others, its commercial pervasiveness lays emphasis to the form
and content of the actual written agreement.3
9
By the state providing the consumer with more than an adequate
amount of regulatory law in the commercial arena, it is no wonder that,
32. For a discussion of what initial effect the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)
has had on debtor-creditor relations within the adopting states, see Black, State Variations
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: The Case for Legislative Restraints, 48 DENVER
L.J. 239 (1971).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-1 to -9 (1971).
34. Id. § 201-7.
35. Id. §§ 500-101 to -602.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (1965).
37. Id. §§ 601-10. It is arguable that section 615(g) is the most significant provision
since it negates the effect of using the "holder in due course" doctrine in certain situations.
38. Id. if 1101-2303 (Supp. 1973).
39. Id. §f 1301-04.
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in the face of offensive collection practice claims, some creditor pro-
ponents defiantly argue that the laws definitely favor the consumer. 40
Recent federal legislation has also been kind to the consumer. The
Consumer Credit Protection Act 4' embodies beneficial provisions rang-
ing from wage garnishment restrictions42 to a multitude of mandatory
disclosures relating to the credit agreement. 48 Even portions of the
Bankruptcy Act 44 have been amended to remedy the overall plight of
the more hard-pressed consumer element. And the beat goes on: On
July 24 of this year the United States Senate unanimously voted for a
new bill that would greatly benefit credit card users.45 That legislation,
currently in the House, restricts interest charges on revolving credit
if the bill is mailed within 14 days of the due date; bans sexual dis-
crimination against credit applicants no matter what the credit trans-
action; and in defiance of firmly-entrenched credit tradition somewhat
abolishes the "holder in due course" doctrine. Needless to say time has
critically weakened the power of the creditor lobby.
D. Judicial Reaction
Given life by a sovereign that functions upon checks and balances
and separation of powers, the law works with equal strength and pur-
pose through the judiciary. Because of the relative infancy of the legis-
lation referred to above, consumerism, like ecology and criminal pro-
cedure, is in a state of flux. However, one would be remiss to sketch
this general scenario without noting that the trend (specifically with
indigents in mind) is manifesting itself most saliently through very im-
portant and far-reaching decisions of the United States Supreme Court.4"
40. Hearings, supra note 6, at 76 (testimony of John Kostelac, President of the McKees-
port Crown Credit Service).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (Supp. 1973).
42. Id. § 1673.
43. Id. §§ 1635-39.
44. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1970) (allows tax claims against the debtor to be discharge-
able if incurred three years prior to bankruptcy); Id. § 32(f)(2) (enjoins creditors from
pursuing the debts of the bankrupt as personal liabilities).
45. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 6, 1973, at 66.
46. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating Pennsylvania and Florida
replevin statutes); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (no judgment by confession might
be entered against individual Pennsylvania residents with incomes of less than $10,000);
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (discharging bankrupt debtor from preexisting auto-
mobile tort judgment in derogation of state statute); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. 395
U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating state prejudgment wage garnishment statute).
Duquesne Law Review
III. THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this paper, as implied earlier, is not to castigate the
credit or collection industries. Many causes, as it shall be seen, con-
tribute to the problem. However, it is the activities complained of that
stir this inquiry. Two fundamental premises must be kept in mind.
There are credit abuses as well as collection abuses. And both must be
studied to detect true fault. There can be no doubt that just debts
should be paid-if not voluntarily then by collection. The creditor
owes it to himself to recover his due. However, a clear view of the
complete picture discloses that there-should be limits beyond which a
collector should not go in recouping what is owing. In this portion of
the article the reader is urged to envision such activity falling some-
where within the confines of the arbitrary scale footnoted earlier. With




Letters are probably the most utilized vehicle for contacting a debtor.
They are sent either by creditors themselves or collection agencies. The
offensiveness of letters strikes in variable forms. They may come every
few days which is needless excessiveness or are just too harsh and abra-
sive.47 In reaction to reading one such letter, one consumer advocate
has sympathetically observed: "When I get a letter like this, it makes
you wonder what is going on in the debt collection business." 48 For
example, many complaints filter into the Allegheny County Consumer
Protection Bureau (Bureau) concerning letters threatening suit,49 pos-
ing the senders as magistrates and attorneys,50 and threatening to ex-
pose debtor to his employer.51 Although some or all of these examples
may be, in essence, completely different, one can see the unifying thread
common to all: intimidation. Another special grouping-legal form
letters-will be taken up later.
47. See Hearings, supra note 6. at 32-35 (testimony of Donna Deaner, Director of the
Allegheny County Consumer Protection Bureau).
48. Id. at 34.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. Hearings, supra note 6, at 36 (testimony of Donna Deaner).
51. Id. at 38.
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2. The Telephone
The gravity of offensive contact with debtors is only heightened by
use of the telephone. 52 The reported instances run the gamut of ways
to incite the debtor to pay. Some include calling third parties wholly
unrelated to the debt (including employers), calling collect, calls to
people not even owing, due to alike names, and, of course, excessive
calling. Incredible as it may seem, some collection phone calls have
even been described as obscene.53
3. Blatant, Brash and Bold
What really seems to ruffle the feathers of consumer advocates, and
maybe most people of common sensibilities, is the audacious type of
tactics in which some creditors indulge. Some will use attorneys' names
and letterheads without their knowledge 54 and, while instances are re-
ported of collectors "trailing" debtors, 55 some have been known to even
visit the debtor's place of employment.56 Speaking from daily contact
with the indefensible conduct of some creditors, one gentleman astutely
observed:
We know of many incidents where wage garnishment or loss of
job is threatened even though wage garnishment by creditors is
outlawed in Pennsylvania .... 57
The extremes to which creditors will go are evident and they no
longer seem to be directing these tactics merely at "deadbeats." One of
the newer target groups falling rather easily to the creditor offensive is
elderly citizens, mostly stemming from medical debts.5 Hospitals are
using collection agencies more and more to effectuate recoveries. Old
people, being generally susceptible to collection pressures, may be easy
victims of intimidation. Outside Pennsylvania there are numerous case
52. Id. at 163-65 (testimony of Thomas Connelly, representative from the Better Busi-
ness Bureau, whose office receives complaints daily); id. at 41 (testimony of Donna Deaner);
id. at 141-44 (testimony of Rose Blytheway, consumer, concerning excessive calling [six
times a day], contacting parties not connected with the debt, and phoning employer).
53. Id. at 175 (testimony of Ethel McCloskey, consumer, in her dealings with a well-
known local financing company).
54. Id. at 168 (testimony of Carol Faust, consumer).
55. Id. at 182 (testimony of Pete Jacobson, Attorney with Neighborhood Legal Services
Consumer Division, Pittsburgh).
56. See generally id. at 100-20 (testimony of Mariann Torbich, consumer [teacher], who
had one collector walk right into her classroom).
57. Id. at 129 (testimony of Byron Chaplin, Executive Director of Consumer Credit
and Counseling Services for Distressed Families).
58. Id. at 186 (testimony of Pete Jacobson).
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reports of other flagrant conduct that has approximated outrageous-
ness, 59 indicating that creditors' tactics are limited only by their
imaginations.
4. The Coercive Aspect
The intimidation wrought by collection practices manifests- itself in
a number of ways. Excessive phone calls or letters alone may be enough
to coax payment from people who do not wish to be bothered. Rather
than resist or delay they simply pay. These tactics, inexcuseable, al-
though they produce the desired result with minimal :harm, are
not that flagrant. However, the same cannot be said of the threat.
Threats of lawsuit and exposing the debtor to his employer are the
most commonly employed. The latter will be dealt with first.
Since exposing a debtor or his situation to the employer is of' no
collection value, what other possible reason can. there be for these
occurrences other than intimidation?. One can only speculate that the
means employed are not presumed irrelevant so long as the desired end
is attained. It is now illegal for a debtor to lose his job because his em-
ployer must comply with a garnishment order.6 0 Since wage garnish-
ment is outlawed in Pennsylvania anyway, the point trying to be made
may seem academic. However, even assuming that it is legal to garnish
wages in this state and that there is no prohibition of discharge for
same, of what practical significance is it to the creditor to contact the
employer when the consequence may well be job loss? Causing a debtor
to be discharged (thus earning no money) defeats .the very purpose of
collecting a debt. Understanding the employer's part in the debt collec-
tion situation, then, no conceivable valid reason occurs to this writer
why an employer should ever be involved.8'
The threat of suit is communicated in a variety of. ways. It may
spring directly from the creditor or the creditor's legal counsel, natu-
rally, because the right to sue is triggered by the debtor's default. How-
ever, it is quite another thing to threaten suit with no intention of ever
59. E.g., Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 583 (1956) (eleven year
old girl threatened with jail unless the creditor was let into the house); Digsby v. Carroll
Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (in response to female debtor's pleading
inability to pay, creditor said he "would take it out in trade"); Gadburg v. Bleitz, 133
Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925) (undertaker delayed cremation of debtor's son until paid).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (Supp. 1973).
61. Cf. Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE LJ. 1679
(1971). The author suggests the collection value of commencing an article 34 (UCMJ)
proceeding is lost since final adjudication results in criminal' sanction. The trial does not
reimburse the creditor so what purpose is served? Id. at .1687-88.
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bringing it. This is clearly an act with- no other purpose than to coerce
the debtor into payment. Proving such an act would of course be diffi-
cult. Unfortunately, the fact that one has no cause of action upon which
to proceed against this conduct renders the proof question moot. Thus,
under the guise of the law, the creditor can forcefully hasten payment.
Collection agencies, on the other hand, are forbidden in Pennsylvania
to threaten suit.62 Their business is to collect on delinquent accounts
for client creditors. Since the greater volume of collectible accounts is
handled by collection agencies, the statute, designed to protect debtors
from certain practices, is aimed at ,them. It might do well to interject
at this point the fact that most complaints coming into the Bureau
office concern conduct of private collection agencies. 63 However, it has
been suggested that three major areas are the cause of the greatest
harm: (1) justices of the peace, magistrates, and aldermen, (2) collec-
tion agencies, and (3) stores handling their own collections.64 The com-
bination of the first with either of the latter two of these areas shows
coercion can be effected by direct utilization of the law. A natural off-
shoot is the use of the legal form letter or "deceptive document" tactic,
one purely designed to intimidate.6 5 The joining together of these
three forces to facilitate attainment of the common objective (collecting
the debt)'makes the wrongdoing that much more difficult to combat.
In the words of one Pittsburgh attorney leading the crusade against
such coercive practices:
When you have the arm of the law acting in conjunction with
collection agents or creditors, then you have got a very serious
abuse.66
One consoling fact to large debtors-if one finds consolation in am-
bivalence-is that a justice of the 'peace has no jurisdiction over 1,000
dollars. However, when the debt is anywhere close to 1,000 dollars, it
has been the personal observation of this writer to see many squires'
transcripts bearing as the amount due 999 dollars and ninety-nine cents.
With a raised eyebrow, the only question then remaining is how much
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4895(a) (1963).
63. Hearings, supra note 6, at 35 (testimony of Donna Deaner);
* 64. Id. at:178 (testimony of Pete Jacobson).
. 65. Id. at 169 (testimony of Carol Faust, who received an invalid "notice of summons').
The use of the "notice of, summons"- has been prohibited since January 1, 1970 and thejustices of the peace must now issue regular complaints. Id. at 171 (testimony of attorney
Robert Adler).
66. Id. at 179 (testimony of Pete Jacobson).
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of the actual debt a creditor is willing to sacrifice to gain access to the
summary procedure of the small claims court.
In addition to the legal forms sent to debtors by justices of the peace,
collection agencies will send out their "Notice Prior to Suit" forms
which have no legal effect but, unfortunately for the unwary consumer,
transmit the threat-the tactical scare of a lawsuit-which induces
either prompt payment or a lot of needless grief.
Common sense dictates that such debt collection practices work a
special hardship on the poor. Two main reasons are advanced for the
plight of the impoverished: (1) indigents are naturally forced to rely
on credit, and (2) with a low income it is easier to fall behind the pay-
ment schedule with concomitant susceptibility to intimidation.6 7
Finally, the gravity of the problem at home is not in any manner
lessened by the fact that some out of state agencies engage in similar
distasteful practices. 68
B. Creditor Counter Charges
To thoroughly analyze this problem it must be borne in mind that
creditors have a side to the issue. Creditors are well aware of the trend
toward debtor sympathy. Indeed, it is intimated the pendulum has
already swung too far. For instance, "[f]ree legal services are making
the debtor the hunter instead of the hunted."6 9 In support of this con-
tention, they point to the federal and state legislation enacted to equal-
ize debtor strength. They also take issue with the charges concerning
debtor letters and phone calls. How else can a debtor be notified of
due dates and tardiness? It is contended that situations are rare where
"non-debtors" are mistakenly contacted. The argument is advanced
that locating debtors' whereabouts is the reason for contacting third
parties. Some feel debtors constantly delay on purpose and, without
some prodding, payment would never ensue.
Others deny committing any type of onerous practices and argue
debtor behavior should not be summarily dismissed as innocent. This
67. Id. at 177. See also D. CAPLOVrrz, Tin PooR PAY MoMx (1963).
68. Hearings, supra note 6, at 54 (testimony of Stephen 'Bryant, consumer). Mr. Bryant
testified that a Chicago-based credit collection company wrote him letters threatening suit,
more specifically, levying on his household goods and garnishing his wages over a delin-
quent gas credit card account.
69. Id. at 19 (testimony of James McDonald, District Manager for central Adjustment
Bureau, a nationwide collection firm).
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is a valid point. It is, however, the collection of the debt that draws
rebuke and not the debtors' evasive plays or their activities accompany-
ing the issuance of credit. Certainly there are "deadbeats" and even
consumer advocates realize it is tough to deal with them. 70
It is put forth that some debtors are breaking the law 71 with impu-
nity. If they can continue to obtain credit by false statements, there will
always be credit abuse. Creditors also are miffed by the stringent re-
quirements of the federal laws; being forced to cater to the consumer
to execute a credit transaction. The collection industry is also taken
aback by the fact that everyone, supposedly, is pointing the finger at it.
Defensively the assertion has been made that there are no restrictions
on government actions when it collects debts, so why make it more
difficult for those who day in and day out deal with shifty debtors. 72
The creditor position on this score, however, begs the issue. Whether
or not the sovereign should be given preferential treatment is not the
concern of this study. It may serve as rebuttal to say in passing that
the state has never been accused of utilizing any methods of harass-
ment and even if it did, that would not justify it as proper.
No matter where one's sentiments lie, a cursory inspection of the
problem conclusively shows that society does need a debt collection in-
dustry. Billions of tied up debt dollars hamper the free flow of money
in a capitalistic economy. 73 This "resources" argument, most will agree,
is difficult to counter. Like the penal system, debt collection, though
not necessarily relished by the average person, is certainly needed.
In asserting continuing violations of section 483874 of the penal code
by debtors, the credit industry may have another valid argument. The
statute was enacted for its protection; to weed out the bad risks with
the ultimate purpose being less reason for having to collect. The debtor
side admits this does present a problem to the credit business but still
maintains that is no excuse for unreasonable collection practices.
Still there are other defenders within the creditor camp who openly
admit part of the collection industry has undergone rapid decline with
70. Id. at 192 (testimony of Pete Jacobson).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4838 (1963) (prohibits the obtaining of credit via false
statements).
72. Hearings, supra note 6, at 81 (testimony of John Kostelac).
73. Id. at 84, 151. (testimony of George Hardt, representative from Pennsylvania
Branch of American Collectors Association).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4838 (1963).
75. Hearings, supra note 6, at 149 (testimony of George Hardt, representative, Penn-
sylvania Branch of American Collectors Association).
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respect to collection procedures. These people are members of the
Pennsylvania Branch of American Collectors Association. This organ-
ization oversees the practices of its members to insure professional in-
tegrity in the industry. It polices its members, utilizes a grievance com-
mittee and has expelled members for "unprofessional" conduct.7 5 Of
course, not all collecting creditors and collection agencies belong to it
and the hearings failed to disclose other relevant details. For instance,
the test for what constitutes such practices warranting explusion was
not made public. The standards may only be geared for penalizing
outrageous vis4-vis unreasonable collection activities. The sanction it-
self may be less than forceful since expulsion from the association puts
the violator in no worse status than a non-member. Despite these
latent deficiencies it is readily apparent some creditors are concerned
about what is happening. Indeed, they show a willingness. to work
plausible proposals into viable solutions.7" In labor language, it shows
one party on the opposite side of the table is willing to bargain in
good faith in an effort to reach agreement. With an attitude like this,
then, the credit business can be defended as a "way to help people." 77
There is also disagreement among the creditors as to the hardcore
element of delinquents who comprise professional deadbeats.78 This
tends to minimize any argument that many debtors should be dealt
with roughly. It also illustrates a progressive attitude from the creditors'
side of the issue.
C. Other Causes
Creditors are quick to remind those concerned, maybe with good
reason, that the consumer has taken undue advantage of them in the
credit card area; a striking example of credit abuse. To this, debtors
reply, creditors can collect as ,long as they stay within the bounds of
reasonableness. If such accounts cannot be collected, creditors are urged
to use all legal means, i.e., pursuing judgment and execution through
legal process. It may be noteworthy at this juncture to point to the fact
that virtually every major oil company in this country solicits the
"educated" consumer to use a gas credit card. After all, it is common
76. Id. at 151.
77. Id. at 159.
78, Id. at 161. Mr. Hardt stated in his opinion only 2 per cent of all debtors were
"deadbeats," whereas Mr. Kostelac asserted a much greater percentage. Id. at 71.
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knowledge that "credit is an easy thing to get into."79 Another le-
gitimate point raised by one consumer protector is that advertising
is- used only to entice people to open charge accounts and borrow
money. 0 Such improvident lending does not help to weed out bad
risk obligors. At least a part of the blame for "poor risk" credit
issuance must be attributed to the industry itself. It is at this ground
level where the problem begins development. Salutory action at this
stage could conceivably cut down on the number of delinquent ac-
counts to be collected. In addition to cursory credit evaluation other
common practices have been enumerated to further indicate the credit
industry is itself building this initial stage of the problem. For example,
insufficient determination of the extent and purpose for borrowing
must be considered a crucial factor. The second stage is not aided
by use of the "greenest" employees in the field to do the actual collect-
ing work.81 Also, part of the problem could be alleviated if creditors
took a lenient attitude toward good faith delinquents. Some refuse to
compromise in any way, such as taking partial payment until the
debtor can get back on his feet. There are, to be sure, sympathetic
creditors willing to grant time, to compromise amicably on such items
as payment schedules. Others care little, if at all, about debtors' per-
sonal problems and pursue the debts without reservation.82 And there
are indications to believe most consumers do not breach their debt
obligations in bad faith. 3 Thus, no good reason can be advanced why
impatient creditors cannot be a little more understanding. With an in-
dulgent attitude the end result could well prove beneficial to both
sides.
D. Suggested Solutions
In dealing with a problem of this scope and magnitude, it is in-
evitable that many solutions are thrust to the fore. The problem has
many facets, only a few of which have been discussed thus far. Many
proposals have been offered-some even tried-with no truly remark-
79. Id. at 53 (testimony of Stephen Bryant, consumer).
80. See note 8 supra.
81. Hearings, supra note 6. at 132 (testimony of Byron Chaplin).
82. Id. at 167 (testimony of Carol Faust, consumer).
83. E.g., Byron Chaplin of Consumer Credit and Counselling Services, speaking from
much personal contact with the problems of debtors, believes most can usually manage
their obligations. In his opinion, it is only when crisis occurs-the lay-off, strike, or illness
-that payments fall behind. Id. at 124. . . ... ....
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able results. This is probably because there is no one answer. The rea-
son seems to be that all defects need to be remedied for a suggested
solution to not only work, but be fair to all parties concerned. A look
at some proposals may help to clarify.
1. Guidelines
Apparently, it is felt the core of the problem is that Pennsylvania
currently has no set standards from which a bill collector can tailor his
collection methods.84 Indeed, the purpose for conducting hearings was
to determine if there is a need for such regulatory measures that would
serve to curb, if not completely eradicate, the abuses currently being
perpetrated. The major drawback here is that this proposal acts to re-
strict only the credit industry. In this writer's opinion, as stated earlier,
causes of the problem attributable to debtors should not be ignored.
It is, however, possible to be asking far too much. Starting with the
premise that debt collection is to be encouraged since it serves to negate
further drain on judicial economy-hence, ameliorating court conges-
tion-one can convincingly argue for the establishment of guidelines.
Evidently, categorizing collectors does not help because some practice
unreasonable collection while others do not. Every collection agency
and self-serving creditor is different. It might prove workable if all
collectors did conduct their practices in uniformity to nullify the dis-
parities inherent in running individual businesses. Some form of gov-
ernmental regulation would create at least a basic pattern common to
all that would necessitate complicity within the parameters of accom-
panying laws. Such guidelines, though not restrictive to debtors, may
in the long run even help creditors to diminish the percentage of un-
collectible accounts. Viewed in this light, then, there appears to be no
good reason why guidelines could not be drafted to alleviate the road
blocks creditors are encountering in collecting on delinquent accounts.
2. Licensing
Another possible solution is to license collection agencies thus sub-
jecting them directly to regulatory supervision of the state. However,
this proposal is open to attack from at least two positions. First, such
supervision would be solely directed to collection agencies leaving un-
restricted those creditors doing their own collections (self-serving cred-
itors). Secondly, it has been pointed out that California has already
84. Id. at 165 (testimony of Thomas Connelly).
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put such plan into effect with no appreciable check on collection
abuses.8 5 Like guidelines to keep creditors within the bounds of reason-
ableness, this solution lacks any thrust toward the debtor community.
3. Enforcement of Pertinent Statutes
Both sides have urged certain statutes exist which, if enforced, will
diminish the severity of the controversy. The creditors offer only one.
They assert section 4838 of the penal code which outlaws the obtaining
of credit by false statements.86 They point to numerous instances and
plead virtual unenforcement in the consumer situation. This conten-
tion is no doubt true but the incidents could be substantially reduced
by a thorough credit check and other reasonable measures of evaluat-
ing credit application forms. Of course, the industry on the whole does
not help to combat this debtor practice with its relatively lax require-
ments policy. Naturally, to be enforced, charges must be brought by
lawful authorities since the statute is penal. Once the debt is made and
owing, this statute is of no collection value to creditors.
Unlike creditors, debtors are armed with a number of statutes sup-
posedly designed to deter collection abuses. One state law prohibits the
use of telephones to harass any individual.8 7 The debtors assert that this
statute is also unenforced. However, a careful reading shows that it is
intended to arrest the commission of obscene calls, and these are very
rare in the collection situation. The clause dealing with harassment,
however, clearly would prohibit many phone collection practices but
for the anonymity requirement. Being that most, if not all, creditors
identify themselves when calling, it is difficult to see how the activity
being complained of could fit within this statutory proscription. Also,
85. Id. at 42 (Donna Deaner). See also Hamburger, Harassment of Borrowers by
Licensed Lenders, 1 Coium. J.L. & Soc. PROD. 39 (1965).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4838 (1963) provides:
Whoever by means of written, printed or oral communication intimidates, or levies
tion or means, or present ability to pay, of himself or any person in whom he is
interested, or for whom he is acting, to procure or receive upon the faith of such false
statement, for the benefit either of himself or of any person in whom he is interested,
or for whom he is acting, any property the payment of cash, the making of a loan or
credit, the extension of credit . . . or the making, acceptance, discount, sale or en-
dorsement of a bill of exchange, promissory note, or of any negotiable instrument, is
guilty of a misdemeanor....
87. Id. § 4414.1 (Supp. 1973) provides:
Whoever telephones another person and addresses to or about such other person any
lewd, lascivious or indecent words, language, suggestion or proposal, or solicitation to
engage in fornication or any other immoral act, or whoever anonymously telephones
another person repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting or harassing such
other person or his or her family, is guilty ....
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there is a federal statute dealing with malicious use of telephones, but
it only applies to interstate calls or foreign communications' s and its
application would be minimal, at best.
Maybe the general "blackmail" statute 9 can be utilized to fit the
coercive type practices often employed. Its relevance here may be
tenuous since defining blackmail is so crucial. The thrust of the argu-
ment is that the threat of exposing the debtor to his employer may be
blackmail since it, arguably, is a means used to coerce payment. The
statute has been used many times to convict "loan sharks." However, it
has never been used to convict a creditor in the consumer situation
probably because the activity here is not the type the statute was in-
tended to prohibit.
Probably the most important statute in this area, as mentioned
earlier, is section 4895 which prohibits certain unlawful collection
agency practices.9 Out of eight subsections only one (subsection (g)) ap-
proaches the types of activity being complained of and it is seriously
deficient in scope. Substantively, it prohibits coercion by use of the
"'deceptive document" mentioned earlier and restricts the agency from
threatening suit. It must be said, then, that enforcement of this statute
in the consumer collection situation would be limited since it does not
outlaw constant phone calls, harsh letters, threats of contacting em-
ployers, contacting employers, and other such tactics testified to at the
hearings. It goes without saying another shortcoming is that it pertains
to collection agencies only and not self-serving creditors, thus leaving
the latter free to collect as they please. And there can be no doubt that
large retail department stores with their own credit departments prey
on hapless debtors in much the same fashion. 91 So, section 4895 does
not appear to be the answer either. The foregoing discussion leads
one to conclude statutory enforcement is not a way out of this problem.
From what has been said it would be hard to refute the contention
88. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4801 (1963) (emphasis added) provides:
Whoever by means of written, printed or oral communciation intimidates, or levies
blackmail, or extorts money, property or other valuable things from any person or by
such means attempts to intimidate, annoy or levy blackmail, or extort money, property
or other valuable things from any person, is guilty ....
90. Id. § 4895(G) provides:
It is unlawful for a collection agency to coerce or intimidate any debtor by deliver-
ing or mailing any paper or document simulating, or intending to simulate, a sum-
mons, warrant, writ, or court process as a means for the collection of a claim, or to
threaten legal proceedings against any debtor....
91. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 121 Pitt. L.J. 137 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. 1973).
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that the relevant state statutes are ineffective. 92 They are too general,
do not encompass most of the alleged activity, and, even if enforced by
the appropriate prosecutorial offices, could not ever approach the pro-
portional amount of complaints. Viewed from the pedestal of imprac-
ticality, misdemeanors are just not that important to warrant such
wholesale prosecutions.
4. Consumer Credit Counseling Services
So far the discussion of possible solutions has presented slanted pro-
posals, i.e., either pro-debtor or pro-creditor. Perhaps some comments
relating the feelings of an involved but neutral party to this controversy
would prove fruitful. The Consumer Credit Counseling Services for
Distressed Families (Service) is such a party. Since the Service wants to
upgrade both elements composing this intricate question---credit and
collection abuse93-its objective is to aid both the debtor and creditor.
In preventing hundreds of cases of bankruptcy it is no wonder that one-
half of its referrals come by way of creditors. 94 Simply stated, the pro-
gram at the Service is designed to take people in debt and help them
to get out of debt. It establishes a system with each client whereby
creditors are paid off over a long-term plan that is amenable to the
debtor's ability to pay.96 The obvious benefits of this approach are that
it helps both debtor and creditor while eliminating the use of any
coercion. In providing financial assistance on a steady basis, the chances
of debtor default become highly remote. The major impediment here
is that its reception into the legal community has been less than favor-
able by most collection attorneys.96 In implementing a program such
as this, it is not difficult to understand why the avowed philosophy at
the Service is "give a man a chance ...."97
The sound tenability of the Service being considered a possible anti-
dote to this infectious situation can best be understood by again visual-
izing it as a two stage entity; credit abuse as the first and collection
abuse as the second. Default on an obligation leads to delinquency
and this in turn beckons the creditor to call for his due. When the
creditor goes beyond the bounds of reasonableness-too frequently it
92. Hearings, supra note 6, at 40 (testimony of Donna Deaner).
93. Id. at 121 (testimony of Byron Chaplin, Director of the Service).
94. Id. at 123.
95. Phone interview with Byron Chaplin, Director of the Service, in Pittsburgh, Nov.
2, 1972.
96. Id.
97. Hearings, supra note 6, at 10 (testimony of Byron Chaplin).
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seems-the second stage is completed. The Service aspires to eliminat-
ing both by venting its energies toward the first. Thus, at least in this
writer's opinion, a plausible proposal for salvation is made out.
5. The Private Civil Suit
When debtors are offended by coercive collection tactics their first
inclination is to complain to some consumer office or other public in-
terest agency. Attorneys usually are not consulted because the debtor
in most instances is legally in default and knows it. These public in-
terest firms are receptive to their pleas and try to help. They investi-
gate the complaints, inform the alleged violators that their actions are
at variance with the law and hope the activity will desist. However,
that is about all they can do. They cannot enforce the present laws be-
cause they are criminal. They certainly have no authority to provide
legal redress for affronted complainants. The local Consumer Protec-
tion Bureau usually channels the more severe complaints to the Neigh-
borhood Legal Service office where some type of extra-judicial settle-
ment usually is effected.
From what has thus been said, it is inevitable to ask just "[w]hat
can a consumer do when he is being illegally harassed?"981 Being that
the criminal sanctions designed to deter such activity have been dis-
missed as ineffective, this question has been energetically entertained
by those espousing the private lawsuit. It is thought a civil remedy
can prove much more helpful because it provides a direct avenue of
recourse. But is recourse the answer? Before squarely addressing this
important question, a long and searching look into what a private suit
entails is indispensible.
To reiterate what was stated earlier, there are no appellate cases in
Pennsylvania delineating any private right of action to aggrieved
debtors for a collection tactic under any tort theory. Whether or not
Pennsylvania will ever recognize such a cause of action is open to de-
bate. Last year, however, in Allegheny County, a trial court was forced
to address the issue in Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co.99 Plaintiffs Vogel and
Smith brought a class action in equity on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated (credit consumers) alleging that certain prac-
tices of the defendant company were coercive and illegal. Such prac-
98. Id. at 41 (testimony of Donna Deaner).
99. 121 Pitt. L.J. 137 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. 1973).
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tices were said to constitute an invasion of privacy 00 and an interfer-
ence with an advantageous relationship. 01 The activities complained
of were phone calls to third parties and letters to employers. The de-
fendant contended these methods were used only to locate the debtor-
plaintiffs, however, the evidence showed that calls were made after lo-
cation was known. The defendant counter-claimed for the debt. The
court, in citing only Forster v. Manchester'02 and Acquino v. Bulletin
Co., 0 3 held that the actions of the defendant company did constitute
an unlawful interference with the affairs of the plaintiffs. The court
felt the weight of the evidence clearly showed that defendant's actions
were designed to coerce and harass plaintiffs into paying the debts.
The court enjoined defendant company from such further acts but;
being of the opinion this was not an appropriate case for a class action,
limited the scope of the order to Vogel and Smith. The defendant's
counterclaim was also sustained.
The two cases cited involved the right of privacy. In Forster, a tres-
pass action based on invasion of privacy and mental distress, the factual
setting involved the constant surveillance by a licensed detective en-
gaged to investigate the activities of the plaintiff who had made a claim
for damages resulting from an automobile accident. In holding that
the plaintiff did not establish that her right to privacy had been in-
vaded, the court referred to the comments of the Restatement of Torts
to define what is actionable.1°4 Acquino merely involved the public
disclosure of wholly private business-a daughter's elopement and
divorce-by a news article, written and published by defendant
company.
The touchstone of the Vogel court's reasoning seems to be section
867 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which reads:
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other. 0 5
100.. Pennsylvania recognizes this tort. Bennet v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959);
Acquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959); Hull v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
101. Pennsylvania recognizes this tort. Glenn v. Point Park College, 441 Pa. 474, 272
A.2d 895 (1971); Capecci v. Liberty Corp., 406 Pa. 197, 176 A.2d 644 (1962); Birl v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d 472 (1960); Snider v. McKean, 36 Pa. D. &
C.2d 203 (C.P. Alleg. Co. 1964).
102. 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963).
103. 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
.104. 410 Pa. at 199, 189 A.2d at 151.
105. RETATEMENT oF TomTS § 867 (1939).
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The Forster and Acquino decisions merely provided a basis for section
867 to be interpreted. They were not debt collection cases. The de-
fendant creditor did not appeal this decision apparently not wanting
to risk an unfavorable affirmance. This fact may loom as a sturdy im-
pediment for other prospective private debtor litigants because there
is good reason to believe piecemeal litigation at the district and county
court level could go both ways. The only other case found-strikingly
similar to Vogel factually-is Graber v' International Creditors Corp. 10 6
Here the court felt pursuit of the debtor-plaintiff combined with the
disclosure of his indebtedness to parties unconnected with the debt was
sufficient ground upon which a claim for invasion of privacy could be
granted. It so held and ordered injunctive relief. Although Graber was
brought to the Vogel court's attention (cited in plaintiff's trial brief),
it was not even alluded to much less relied upon. This indicates, not-
withstanding the same result was reached, that trial courts can rule
contrary to precedent in the absence of some "test" case binding county
jurisdictions throughout the commonwealth. What the next step will
be is anyone's guess. One thing is certain. Until Vogel, a debtor's right
(in Allegheny County anyway) to engage in a purely private credit
transaction free from publicity to others could be violated by creditors
with no private recourse. Today, a local debtor is free to seek injunc-
tive relief.
If and when a case such as Vogel obtains appellate review a survey
of other jurisdictions will disclose decisions favorable to the debtor.
This illustrates the willingness of the judiciary to curb harassing col-
lection practices while maintaining pace with the consumer trend. Be-
fore addressing the question posed at the outset of this segment of the
article, an abbreviated look beyond Pennsylvania's borders may prove
helpful in understanding how other courts choose to deal with private
remedial suits.
In rendering debt collectors liable for certain activities some states
have been recognizing actionable claims brought under various tort
theories. 10 7 What theory a debtor utilizes depends on the particular
activity in which the creditor engages. The nature of the offensive con-
106. Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 3, 1970, at 14.
107. See;e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (right of
privacy); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo. 1970) (right of privacy and intentional
inflication of mental distress); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 303, 242 N.W. 25
(1932) (mental distress); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972)
(right of privacy); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 427, 253 N.W. 424 (1934)
(mental pain and suffering).
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duct, of course, may lend itself to more than one theory. Consequently,
with the overlap produced by some of these collection efforts, a debtor is
not forced to rely upon one theory. Although creditor contact with a
third party usually breeds a right of privacy action, activity solely
against the debtor may foster mental distress and privacy claims. The
reason for the privacy claim is that the debtor has a right to be let
alone. So forceably double-barrelled, the privacy action can be most
useful for a vengeful debtor since it can-through sophisticated argu-
ments by resourceful attorneys-be advanced to encompass the most
common coercive practices; calls at all hours (right to be let alone),
contacting neighbors, relatives and employers (right to have private
business not made public), excessive letters (right to be let alone).
Another advantage with the privacy claim is that, unlike mental dis-
tress, proof of physical injury is unnecessary. Although other theories
have been used, 08 privacy and mental distress suits are easily the most
prevalent.
The test for determining whether the alleged conduct of a creditor
is actionable does not appear to hinge simply on reasonableness. This
is understandable since a creditor must be allowed, most will agree,
to prod the debtor to some extent. This is just one of many unpleasant
facts of life that everyone endures. The reasonable man standard
seems displaced here for another reason that is perhaps stronger. In
contracting for credit, the debtor assents to the positive obligation to
pay back, thus creating a special commitment, one clearly distinct from
the duty to not act negligently toward another which is governed
by the reasonable man standard. In judging, then, the conduct of a
creditor who attempts to collect something that is rightfully his, the
test for what is actionable should be something more than unreason-
ableness. Needless to say, the gauge for what is actionable varies among
the states and with the tort theory implemented. That is to say, some
jurisdictions in privacy cases require a "systematic campaign"'109 of
108. See, e.g., Lewis v. Burdine, 240 Ark. 821, 402 S.W.2d 398 (1966) (malicious abuse of
process); Coy v. Advance Automatic Sales Co., 228 Cal App. 2d 313, 39 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1964)
(malicious abuse of process); Fennell v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492 (1966)
(defamation); Stickle v. Trimmer, 50 N.J. Super. 518, 143 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1958) defa-
mation).
109. See, e.g., Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App.), appeal denied, 245 La. 84, 157
So. 2d 231 (1963) (letters and calls to debtor's employer after debtor's defense to claim made
known to creditor); Biederman's Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (following
debtor to work and constant degrading remarks and threats made in public); Housh v.
Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (six to eight calls a day for three week period);
Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (daily phone calls and
numerous threats).
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harassment before a cause of action will be entertained while others
hold "minimal contact" 110 by creditors with third parties to be suffi-
cient. Still another line of cases holds it actionable to contact any third
party regardless of degree of contact."'
From the foregoing discussion there would seem to be no sound
reason why a debtor could not base a claim on established tort theory,
assuming all the necessary elements of the cause of action are met. Of
course, gross misconduct is required for intentional infliction of mental
distress but it is merely conjectural as to what type of conduct-or
more precisely what test-the higher Pennsylvania courts would re-
quire for an actionable claim based on privacy.
Taking this discussion one step further, an even more important
question that emerges is whether collection activity can be redressed
by way of a new and separate tort. At least two jurisdictions have gone
beyond recognizing claims based on traditional tort theories, i.e., mold-
ing the facts of the alleged activity to fit the elemental contours of the
tort. This issue was initially raised in Harned v. E-Z Finance Co.112
Here the plaintiff-debtor sought damages for mental anguish allegedly
caused by defendant's collection tactics. The allegation pointed to such
practices as threats of job loss, abusive language, and untimely phone
calls. The court ruled plaintiff failed to state a cause of action be-
cause physical injuries were not sustained, deeming injuries a neces-
sary element to recovery. Quick to follow was Duty v. General Finance
Co.1 3 which, in allowing recovery on basically the same facts, dis-
tinguished Harned because there the debtor did not allege physical
injury. Thus the debtor, by merely adding a claim for physical injury
to his complaint, was granted a cause of action to recover for mental
anguish caused by the manner in which the defendant attempted to
collect on note balances. In creating a separate tort to redress extremely
harassing activity by debt-collecting creditors, Duty did not define limits
to which creditors could go."4 Thus a gap was created within which
110. See, e.g., Timperley v. Chase Collection Serv., 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr.
782 (1969) (one letter to employer); Tollefson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 142 Colo. 442,
351 P.2d 274 (1960) (one call apiece to debtor's wife and employer); Gouldman-Taber
Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957) (one letter to employer); Patton
v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) (two letters to employer); Household
Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 539, 250 A.2d 878 (1969) (two phone calls to employer).
111. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962); Quiana V.
Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 81 N.M. 383, 467
P.2d 399 (1970); Ware v. Paxton, 359 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1961).
112. 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
113. 154 Tex. 16. 273 S.W.2d 64(1954).
114. Id. at 18, 273 S.W.2d at 66.
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later cases could expand the new concept of redress. Being without the
elements of traditional tort theory, recovery in Texas is now permitted
on a finding of unreasonable collection efforts, 115 rather than on a find-
ing of outrageous conduct that is normally required for mental dis-
tress actions. The progeny of Duty has left Texas no definitive law re-
garding actionability. One test for what is actionable in a debt collec-
tion case is that activity which a person of ordinary prudence would
not use in similar circumstances." 6 However, two recent cases have
opted for the stiffer criteria for what constitutes "unreasonable efforts"
and required wilful and wanton harassment." 7 So it seems for now that
until the Texas Supreme Court decides to explicitly define "unreason-
able collection efforts" that state's inferior courts will not uniformly
discharge their obligations in permitting private redress to the plaintiff-
debtor.
Aside from Texas, Louisiana has also adverted to the suggestion that
"unreasonable collection efforts" are in themselves tortious."18
When one realizes that Duty, in opening the floodgates for private
litigation, has been the law of Texas for nearly two decades, it would
seem that, even with such liberal treatment, the private suit has not
proved to be the coercive collection deterrent many claim it to be.
This one significant aspect of the debt collection problem-private
redress for the debtor-is much too broad to be further explored.
Many scholarly commentaries have done justice to the private remedy
by analyzing all the relevant tort theories and discussing the varying
ways in which they may be fitted to common collection circumstances.1 9
The brief exposure here was meant only to emphasize the growing im-
portance of the tort remedy as a suggested solution to the problem of
debt collection.
115. Whatley v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 451 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
116. Pioneer Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). The
definition has never reached the Texas Supreme Court for a ruling. United Fin. & Thrift
Corp. v. Bain, 400 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1966) (per curiam).
117. Whatley v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 451 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Brewer, 416 S.W2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
118. Pack v. Wise, 245 La. 84, 155 So. 2d 909 (1963); Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp.,
217 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1968); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944).
119. See, e.g., Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to
the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 802 (1972); Greenfield, Coercive
Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 U. WASH. L.Q. 1;
Hart, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W.VA. L. Rxv. 201 (1965); Martin, A Creditor's Liabilityfor Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a New Tort in Texas, 9 S. Tax.
L.J. 127 (1967); Sheinfeld, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection Activ-
ities, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 615 (1972); Comment, Collection Capers: Liability for Debt
Collection Practices, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 572 (1957).
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In backtracking to the question posed at the beginning of this dis-
cussion firmer ground now enables a competent answer. It is submitted
that private recourse does not appear to be the way to commercial
peace. Indeed, it does not lend itself to righting the whole problem.
Retribution, no matter how vengeful or satisfying, will not eradicate
the cause of the friction between the debtor and creditor. Permitting
the debtor to sue via private causes of action for injunctive relief will
not lessen the creditors' desire to collect, keeping in mind it may well
deter unscrupulous conduct. The argument is double-edged. If a debtor
cannot pay off his financial obligations, how can he afford a private
attorney? And no attorney will take such a case on contingency fee
because the only two cases of precedential value, Vogel and Graber,
merited equitable relief. Seeking only damages could prove perilous
since Judge O'Malley, by way of dicta, hinted in Vogel: "The harm
that is caused by the action of the defendant is not of a nature that
may be compensated for in damages at law." 120 Here again, in the
absence of a damages test case, it does not appear likely such an action
will be brought unless the challenge be made by a legal aid office. Of
course, should such a remedy ever be permitted the possibility of manu-
factured suits is not out of the question: the legal community is well
aware of the professional plaintiff in other areas of private redress, e.g.,
automobile negligence and products liability cases.
Any private remedy proponent must also ward off the crowded docket
argument. Afterall, one of the major purposes of debt collection is to
dispense with the time and expense of utilizing legal process. And
make no mistake, the dockets would be affected since whatever test is
applied for unlawful collection determination, that key issue must gen-
erally be determined on the facts of each case. 1 1 This would certainly
contribute to judicial congestion because every case would necessitate
a trial of the facts. Will that really deter abusive collection practices?
More importantly, will it help to diminish the far too many delinquen-
cies? Of course not, and again attention must be drawn to the fact that
creditors have an interest in this problem. Because of the aforemen-
tioned reasons, this writer fails to see how the private tort suit will
quell the animosities between creditors and debtors, minimize defaults,
and exterminate the ill effects on society fashioned by this growing
social dilemma.
120. 121 Pitt. L.J. 137, 139 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. 1973).
121. See, e.g., Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950).
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E. Legislative Action-Bill 649
The Pennsylvania General Assembly, probably in response to last
year's hearings, has recognized that there is a problem. The Unfair
Debt Collection Practices Law122 (Bill 649) is currently in committee.
This bill seeks to regulate collection practices by restrictive provisions
much more encompassing than the statutes heretofore discussed. For
one thing, it pertains to all collecting creditors and not just collection
agencies. Section 3, the teeth in the bill, prohibits communication with
any third parties, outlaws harassment and intimidation in general,
limits phone calls and expressly nullifiies use of deceptive documents
and simulation of judicial process. Section 4 permits the District
Attorney to seek injunctive relief while section 5 authorizes a maxi-
mum 5,000 dollar penalty for violation of a restraining order. And
more significantly, section 6 endows the debtor with a civil private
cause of action for any damages proximately caused by a violation of
the act.
If Bill 649 ever becomes law these rudimentary highlights point to
marked improvement over the statutes presently on the books. It pro-
scribes most, if not all, of the common devices many creditors utilize.
The restrictions can be said to serve as guidelines in that what is im-
permissible is clearly spelled out. And it also affords retribution means
for conduct truly injurious to the debtor. Although on paper, it is
eminently better than what the law now is, some questions prematurely
loom on the horizon. Will it too go unenforced like the present stat-
utes? If not, what effect will it have on judicial administration? Is it
tough enough to deter recalcitrant collectors or will it just alienate
more those creditors who already feel the law favors the debtors?
Since it does not effect debtor activity, it is difficult to speculate
about its chances of being a complete cure-all. At any rate, it appears
to be a step in the right direction.
F. The Real Victim
When a debtor defaults on payment his particular creditor suffers
the immediate wrong. Likewise, when a creditor employs an unreason-
122. Pa. House Bill 649, Legislative Bull. No. 7 (April 11. 1973).
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able collection tactic, his particular debtor is wronged. No one cares
about isolated instances. Before studying debt collection, analyzing
the hearings, and.talking to the people who work both ends, the writer
did not care either. But careful examination has proved enlightening.
This paper did not deal with a preconceived collection of hypothetical
incidents. Those referred to are real complaints. No doubt, these activ-
ities have been carried on for some time but recently people have been
complaining with increasing loudness. This makes it a social problem;
a social disease. Granted, it has not reached the alarming status ac-
corded to racial conflict or pollution, but it grows steadily. Like can-
cer, it too casts warning signals which, if not heeded, can leave its in-
delible mark on society: Racism first received attention in 1865 and to
this day has not been eliminated. The time has come when debt col-
lection can no longer go unattended. The symptoms are now salient:
(1) debt delinquency spawns higher interest rates to compensate the
creditor for risks of non-payment and collection costs causing borrow-
ing and purchasing costs to soar, (2) debtors are citizens and certain of
their rights are being violated in the face of indifference, and (3) cred-
itors are being denied their due. Other symptoms, not so evident, are
just as harmful. Marriage counselors assert that over one-half of the
families seeking advice are in conflict over debt.1 23 If this contention is
valid one can justifiably speculate that financial headaches can lead
people to varying manifestations of despair: alcoholism, job loss or in-
efficiency, mental breakdowns, etc.124 Society suffers in countless other
ways too. For one, the flow of commerce is not enhanced when com-
mercial obligations are not met. Throughout this paper numerous al-
lusions have been made to collection activities implicating parties
completely unconnected with the credit transaction. Such activity
breeds consumer distrust for the commercial setting and another bond
of societal cohesion becomes severed, thus weakening the whole.
Debt collection is not a pestilence, it is a syndrome and should not
be allowed to linger. How to eliminate it is as perplexing as the prob-
lem itself. Indeed, there may be no panacea at all. But there are avail-
able means by which attempts can be made to arrest its growth. The
time to act is now.
123. Hearings, supra note 6, at 24 (testimony of Byron Chaplin).
124. For a case or two in point, see generally id. at 126-28.
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IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering the preceding remarks one is by now
prone to take sides with one party to the controversy. The writer ad-
heres, however, to the pledged objective. On the whole, affronted
debtors appear to be the most harmed. However, drafting a resolution
favorable to them does nothing to aid innocent creditors. Suggested
solutions, save the Service, have been viewed with disdain. Having all
interests recognized in a solution will benefit society. The ideal solu-
tion does not appear to exist; to be sure, the writer cannot propose an
acceptable one.
The fact remains that present Pennsylvania law is inadequate to en-
able consumers to withstand objectionable practices by bill collectors
while at the same time permitting creditors to utilize some extra judi-
cial means by which they can satisfy their accounts. Maybe some type
of uniform regulation is the best, if not ideal, proposal. It is urged no
matter what side one prefers to align his opinions with, something
should be done soon. If the consumer movement to date is any indi-
cation of hope, logic must yield the belief that the call for deliverance
has not fallen upon deaf ears.
JON J. VICHICH
